The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the transformation of Hamas? by Gerges, Fawaz A.
  
Fawaz A. Gerges 
The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the 
transformation of Hamas? 
 
Report 
 
 
 Original citation: Gerges, Fawaz A. (2009) The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the transformation of Hamas? 
IDEAS reports - strategic updates, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SU003. LSE IDEAS, London School 
of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43641/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2009 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
9The Transformation of Hamas?
S
omething is stirring within the Hamas body politik, a 
moderating trend that, if nourished and engaged, could 
transform Palestinian politics and the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. There are unmistakable signs that the religiously-based 
radical movement has subtly changed its uncompromising 
posture on Israel. Although low-key and restrained, those 
gradual shifts and nuances indicate that Hamas leaders are 
searching for a formula which addresses the concerns of 
Western powers yet avoids alienating their hard-line supporters. 
For example, in the last few months top Hamas officials have publicly stressed that they want 
to be part of the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, not part of the problem. What is 
happening inside Hamas’ mosques and social base shows a concerted effort on the part of 
its leadership to re-educate its rank and file about coexistence with the Jewish state and in so 
doing mentally prepare them for a permanent settlement in the future. 
COEXISTENCE WITH THE JEWISH STATE
In Gazan mosques pro-Hamas clerics have reportedly begun to cite the example of Salah 
al-Din al-Ayubi, a famed Muslim military commander and statesman, who, after liberating 
Jerusalem from the Western Crusaders, allowed them to retain a coastal state of their 
own. The moral lesson of the story is that if Ayubi could tolerate the warring, blood-thirsty 
Crusaders, then today’s Palestinians should be willing to live peacefully with a Jewish state in 
their midst. 
The Ayubi story is important because it provides Hamas with religious legitimacy and allows 
it to justify and explain its change of direction to followers. As an Islamic-based movement, 
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Hamas’ very raison d’etre rests on religious 
legitimation, and its leaders understand 
that they neglect that at their peril. Western 
leaders and students of international politics 
therefore need to appreciate that Hamas 
can no more abandon its commitment to 
Islamism than the United States can abandon 
its commitment to liberal democracy. That 
does not however mean that Hamas is 
incapable of change or compromise, simply 
that its identity is strongly constituted by its 
religious legitimation.
Hamas’ recent narrative marks a pronounced 
departure from the past. Previously, Hamas 
moderates called for tahdia (a minor truce) 
or hudna (a longer-term truce lasting as long 
as 50 years), which obviously implies some 
measure of recognition. Hamas moderates, 
in effect, justified their policy shift by using 
Islamic terms. In Islamic history, hudnas 
sometimes develop into permanent truces. 
Now Hamas leaders appear to be going 
further by laying the ground for a shift 
in their position by educating their social 
base about the requirements of permanent 
peace – recognition of the Jewish state. 
Although the evolution of Hamas’ stance on 
the peace process has been slow, gradual, 
and qualified, in the last three years many of 
its leaders have repeatedly said they want a 
two-state solution. Khaled Meshaal, the top 
Hamas leader and head of its political bureau 
based in Syria and considered a hard-liner, 
acknowledged as much. “We are realists,” 
he said, and recognized that there is “an 
entity called Israel.”
Pressed by an Australian journalist on policy 
changes that Hamas might make to any new 
order, Meshaal asserted that the organization 
has already shifted on several key points: 
“Hamas already changed – we accepted the 
national accords for a Palestinian state based 
on 1967 borders, and we took part in the 
2006 Palestinian elections.”
Another senior Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad, 
Khaled Meshaal has signalled Hamas’ 
willingness to moderate its attitude 
towards Israel.
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was more specific than Meshaal, telling journalists in January that Hamas would be satisfied 
with ending Israeli control over the areas occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War — the West 
Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. In other words, the organization would not hold out for the 
liberation of the land that currently includes Israel. 
Yet it would be wrong to regard Hamas’ position as monolithic on this issue, since there are 
multiple clashing viewpoints and narratives within the movement. Over the years, I have 
interviewed more than a dozen Hamas leaders inside and outside the Palestinian territories. 
Although, on the whole, Hamas’ public rhetoric calls for the liberation of all historic Palestine, 
not only the territories occupied in 1967, a healthier debate occurs within.
My recent conversations with Hamas’ rank and file suggest that the militant organization has 
evolved considerably since the group unexpectedly won power in Gaza in free elections in 
2006. Before that, Hamas was known for its suicide bombers, not its bureaucrats. But that 
had to change. “It is much more difficult to run a government than to oppose and resist Israeli 
occupation,” a senior Hamas leader told me while on official business in Egypt in 2007. “If we 
do not provide the goods to our people, they’ll disown us.” Ironically, in spite of the West’s 
refusal to regard their government as legitimate, the democratic demands for governance 
from within Gaza are themselves driving change within Hamas.
AGAINST ALL ODDS?
What is striking about Hamas’ shift toward the peace process is that it has come at a 
trying time for the Islamist organization which, in the last two years, has faced critical 
challenges from Al Qaeda-like jihadist groups, a low-intensity civil war with rival Fatah, the 
ruling party of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in 
Gaza. 
Last summer a militant group called Jund Ansar Allah, or the Warriors of God, one of a 
handful of radical Al Qaeda-inspired factions, declared the establishment of an Islamic 
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Caliphate in Gaza, in a flagrant rejection of Hamas’ authority. Hamas security forces struck 
instantly and mercilessly at the Warriors, killing more than twenty members, including the 
group’s leader, Abdel-Latif Mousa. In one stroke, the Hamas leadership sent a message to 
its foes and friends that it will not tolerate the existence of global jihadist groups like Al 
Qaeda:  Hamas will not allow Al Qaeda-inspired factions to turn Gaza to a theatre to wage 
transnational jihad. 
However, the challenge to Hamas’ authority persists. Israel’s brutal siege of Gaza, in place 
since 2007, along with the suffering and despair it has caused to its 1.4 million inhabitants, 
has driven hundreds of young Palestinians into the arms of small Salafist extremist factions 
that accuse Hamas of forfeiting the armed struggle and failing to implement Qur’anic or 
shariah law. Compared to these puritanical and nihilistic groups, Hamas (this might sound 
strange to Western ears) is well within the moderate mainstream of the broad spectrum of 
radical Islamist politics.
   
Operationally and ideologically, there are 
huge differences between Hamas and Al 
Qaeda and its various inspired factions, and 
a lot of bad blood. Hamas is a broad-based religious-nationalist resistance whose focus and 
violence is limited to Palestine and Israel, while Al Qaeda is a small, transnational terrorist 
group that has carried out attacks worldwide. Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, Al 
Qaeda’s chiefs, have vehemently criticized Hamas for its willingness to play politics and 
negotiate with Israel. Hamas’ leaders have responded that they know what is good for their 
people, and have made it crystal clear that they have no interest in transnational militancy. 
Their overriding goal is political rather than ideological: to empower their people and liberate 
the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Thus Hamas, unlike Al Qaeda and other fringe factions, is not merely an armed militia 
but a viable social movement with an extensive social network and a large popular base 
that has been estimated at more than half a million supporters and sympathizers. Hamas 
“there are huge 
differences between 
Hamas and Al Qaeda”
13
has also shown itself to be sensitive and 
responsive to Palestinian public opinion. A 
convincing argument could be made that 
the recent changes in Hamas’ conduct may 
be attributed to the high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, and pain of Palestinians who 
live in a state of isolation in Gaza and the 
fear that things may spiral out of control.       
A further example of its political and social 
priorities is Hamas’ decision to engage with 
an Egyptian-brokered deal that sketches out 
a path to peace with rival Fatah, though no 
breakthrough is imminent. 
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Despite its wooden and reactionary rhetoric, 
Hamas is a rational actor, a conclusion 
reached by former Mossad chief Ephraim 
Halevy, who also served as Ariel Sharon’s 
national security advisor and who is certainly 
not an Israeli peacenik. The Hamas leadership 
has undergone a transformation “right 
under our very noses” by recognizing that 
“its ideological goal is not attainable and 
will not be in the foreseeable future,” Halevy 
wrote in Yedioth Ahronoth a few months 
ago. His verdict is that Hamas is now ready 
and willing to accept the establishment of 
a Palestinian state within the temporary 
borders of 1967.
The US Army Strategic Studies Institute 
published a similar analysis just weeks before 
the launch of the 2008 Israeli offensive, 
concluding that Hamas was considering a 
shift of its position, and that “Israel’s stance 
toward [Hamas] ... has been a major obstacle 
to substantive peacemaking.” 
Indeed, it can be argued that Hamas has 
moved closer to a vision of peace consistent 
with international consensus – the concept 
of two separate states in historic Palestine – 
than the current Israeli governing coalition. 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
vehemently opposes the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state on the 
West Bank and Gaza, with its capital in East 
Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s governing coalition 
is more right-wing and pro-settlement than 
he is. 
Yet if Hamas is so eager to accept a two-state 
solution, why doesn’t it simply announce 
that it recognizes Israel’s existence and 
promise to negotiate a peace deal that allows 
the two countries to coexist? In interviews 
with Hamas officials, they stress that their 
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organization has made significant concessions to the Quartet’s three conditions, though 
the Quartet has not lifted the punishing sanctions against Hamas nor has it pressed Israel to 
end its the siege of Gaza. Israel’s siege of Gaza has caused a dire humanitarian crisis in the 
occupied territories, and since Hamas’ leaders believe that accepting Israel’s presence is the 
last card in their arsenal they are reluctant to bargain it away before the talks even start. Their 
diplomatic starting point will be to demand that Israel recognizes the nationalist rights of the 
Palestinian rights and withdraws from their occupied territories, but it will not be their final 
position.
A ROUTE FORWARD
There can be no viable, lasting peace 
agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians if Hamas is not consulted about 
peacemaking and if the Palestinians remain 
divided with two warring authorities in the 
West Bank and in Gaza. Hamas has the 
means and public support to undermine any 
agreement that does not address the legitimate rights and claims of the Palestinian people. 
Its rival, Fatah and the PA, lacks a  popular mandate and the legitimacy needed to implement 
a resolution of the conflict.  President Mahmoud Abbas has been politically weakened by a 
series of blunders of his own making, and with his moral authority compromised in the eyes of 
a sizable Palestinian constituency, Abbas is yesterday’s man. 
Like it or not, Hamas is the most powerful organization in the occupied territories and it is 
deeply entrenched in Palestinian society. Neither Israel nor the Western powers can wish it 
away. The good news, if my reading is correct, is that Hamas has changed and met some of 
the conditions of the Quartet, and is making the domestic political preparations for further 
concessions.
Hamas supporters demonstrate against 
the closure of the Rafah Border crossing.
15
If, instead of ignoring Hamas or, worse 
yet, seeking its overthrow, the United 
States and Europe engaged the Islamically-
based organization, diplomatically and 
politically, and encouraged it to continue 
moderating its views, the West could test 
the extent of Hamas’ evolution and find 
out if the organization is willing to accept a 
settlement based on the two-state solution. 
So far, the strategy of isolating and militarily 
confronting Hamas pursued by Israel and 
the Bush administration has not appeared 
to weaken the organization dramatically. 
If anything, what success this strategy 
has had in undermining Hamas has been 
counterproductive, since it has radicalized 
hundreds of young Palestinians who have 
joined extremist Al Qaeda-inspired factions 
and reinforced the culture of martyrdom and 
nihilism. All the while, the siege and isolation 
of Gaza has also left a trail of untold pain 
and suffering. 
If it won’t engage Hamas, the US and 
Europe will never know if it can evolve 
into an open, tolerant and peaceful social 
movement. The truth is that the jury is still 
out on whether Hamas, a religiously-oriented 
radical movement, can make that painful 
and ideologically costly transition. But the 
argument that engaging Hamas legitimizes 
the Islamist organization does not carry much 
weight because Hamas derives its legitimacy 
from a popular mandate by the Palestinian 
people. To break this impasse, and prevent 
further gains by more extremist factions, 
Europe, particularly Great Britain, should 
support a unified Palestinian government 
that could negotiate peace with Israel. The 
forthcoming truce deal between Hamas and 
Fatah at the end of October is an opportunity 
that may be built on to repair and strengthen 
intra-Palestinian governing institutions that 
have been frayed as a result of intense rivalry 
in the last two years. 
Since the Obama administration is currently 
unwilling to engage with Hamas, which 
remains designated a terrorist organization, 
Britain ought to take the lead in establishing 
an official connection with the Islamist 
movement. The British government has 
already dealt with Lebanon’s Hizbollah, 
a similar-minded group to Hamas, and 
possesses the skills, experience and political 
weight  to break the deadly embrace and 
help broker a viable peace settlement.
A version of this article appeared in The 
Nation.
